Lessons from WKCD - 17 Jul, 2005

Lessons from West Kowloon
Executive Council is mere formality

Dear Subscribers and Friends

LegCo’s report published on 6 July on West Kowloon (WK) is a “must read” for anyone interested in politics and political economy. News headlines the next day said ExCo and LegCo had been “bypassed” in government’s decision-making.

What happened over WK shows how “executive-led” government Hong Kong style can emasculate ExCo. The chief executive (CE) and responsible ministers just didn’t with it. Is this the foundation upon which Donald Tsang (DT) wants to build good governance?


A. What is ExCo … a gathering of assistants of no consequence?

1. ExCo appointments: ExCo members are appointed by the CE. Those with portfolios are full-time ministers whereas those without portfolios can be part-timers.

2. An assistant’s role: Article 54 of the Basic Law provides ExCo is there to “assist” the CE in decision-making.

3. Important policy decisions: Article 56 requires the CE to “consult” ExCo “before making important policy decisions”. The CE is not bound by ExCo’s majority opinion. All the CE has to do when he disagrees with ExCo is to “put the specific reasons on record” and then carry on.

B. WK experience … “executive-led” decision-making at work

1. Plan change: After the CE’s 1999 policy address announcing to plan a large performance venue in WK, ExCo approved a review of the usage of the site which had been slated for a regional park, open spaces, and community usage with a small portion for commercial development.

2. Enlarged project: In 3/00, the government announced a concept plan competition for the site for a much enlarged project, which Foster won in 2/02.

3. Steering Committee (SC): In 9/02, a ministerial SC chaired by chief secretary DT with 5 other ministers was formed to plan and implement the WK project.

4. Little transparency: The actual content of WK [i.e. single developer, canopy, multiple museums etc] was not made public until mid-2003 when the government announced it would invite development proposals. As information became available, public disquiet mounted that it was a property project benefiting the “big boys” disguised as a cultural project.

5. LegCo’s question: What were the reasons and basis for the government change of policy from planning a large performance venue to the huge WK project?

C: LegCo’s findings … many examples of bad governance

1. Decision-making on whims: There has been no detailed study on how WK should be developed prior to government’s announcement to launch the competition; no study on viability of the proposed financial/implementation model; and no complementary arts and cultural policies studies done.

2. Getting round LegCo: To get round legislative oversight, the project required no public money to be spent that LegCo has to approve! As such, the winning developer had to take on all the spending.

3. ExCo is mere formality: ExCo did not discuss WK from the time it endorsed the review of site usage in 1999 till June 2003. In 11/04, amidst loud and continuing public controversy, ExCo was asked to approve various SC decisions.

4. Various irregularities: LegCo also found various irregularities in the disposition of land and approval of zoning plans.

D. Observations - where do we go from here?

How DT deals with WK from now on will indicate whether and how he will improve governance. He headed the SC after all. Under Hong Kong’s constitutional system, good governance depends on the CE’s behaviour and the kind of cabinet culture he wants to build.

CHRISTINE LOH
Civic Exchange - HK’s independent think tank
For other publications: www.civic-exchange.org